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II. ANTITRUST
Compensable Injuries Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act
Under section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act1 private parties injured
by illegal anticompetitive activities may bring actions for recovery of
treble damages.2 In Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co.,3 the Fourth
Circuit found that a plaintiff seeking section 4 recovery can suffer
compensable injury4 even though the plaintiff's profits increased during
the period following the defendant's alleged statutory antitrust violation.5
In Lee-Moore, the plaintiff bought Union Oil Products at wholesale
and distributed the products to retail outlets.6 The retailers then sold the
products to consumers under the Union brand name.7 The plaintiff and
mission determination. Id. at 17. Reasoning that the EEOC's determination of reasonable
cause is nonbinding and is investigative rather than adjudicative, the First Circuit con-
cluded that the failure to receive such a determination represents no loss which would in-
volve due process consideration. Id. at 18.
Similarly, the Maryland federal district court held in a recent case that the APA does
not provide for review of a reasonable cause determination since the EEOC has engaged in
no final action. Kelly v. EEOC, 468 F. Supp. 417, 418 (D. Md. 1979) (citing Georator). See
also Dresser Indus., Inc. v. United States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1238 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Ge-
orator in declining to review non-final decision of Securities and Exchange Commission).
1 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See note 2 infra.
2 A private plaintiff must establish six factors in order to recover § 4 treble damages.
The plaintiff first must prove that it is a "person" within the meaning of § 4. See Pfizer, Inc.
v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 311-20 (1978). Second, a violation of the antitrust
laws must have occurred. See Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F.2d 885, 887 (4th
Cir. 1934). Third, the violated antitrust statute must be within the coverage of § 4. See
Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1958). Fourth, there must be an
injury to the plaintiff's business or property. See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642,
648 (1969). Fifth, a direct and causal anticompetitive relationship must exist between the
statutory violation and the plaintiff's injury. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-89 (1977). Sixth, the plaintiff's injury must be measurable in dollars
to some degree. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489
(1968). See generally J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 293-301 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as VAN CISE]; 16A Business Organizations, J. voNKALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST
LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 11.04[1] (1979) [hereinafter cited as voNKALINOWSKI]; The
Private Action-The Corporate Manager's Heavy Artillery, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 5 (1973).
Antitrust actions brought by private parties rather than government agencies are con-
sidered a principal means of statutory enforcement. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Inter-
national Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968)(importance of private actions discussed); 16J
voNKALINOWSKI, supra § 81.0211]; Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Anti-
trust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167, 167-69 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Loevinger].
3 599 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1979).
' See note 2 supra.
599 F.2d at 1304-05.
6 Id. Lee-Moore was formed in 1972 as a result of the merger of four petroleum distri-
bution companies. The present action involved Lee-Moore's predecessor, Johnson Oil Co. of
Sanford, Inc. Id. at 1300.
Id. The Lee-Moore plaintiff claimed that brand name gasoline was superior to un-
branded or non-major brand gasoline because of differences in consumer perceptions. Id.
See text accompanying notes 51-52 infra.
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defendant operated on a year to year contract which was automatically
renewed unless one party gave timely notice of cancellation. In
September, 1972, the defendant notified the plaintiff that the agreement
would not be renewed on expiration.8 The plaintiff was unable to locate
an alternate source of brand name gasoline for most of its customers9 and
bore the cost of converting most stations to a non-major, independent
brand.10
The plaintiff filed suit against Union claiming Union's refusal to
renew the agreement violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.1 The plaintiff alleged Union was part of an illegal conspiracy among
major oil producers to drive maverick distributors, such as the plaintiff,
out of business.1 2 As a result of the alleged conspiracy, the plaintiff
sought treble damages' s for lost profits and costs incurred in searching for
alternate supplies and switching to an independent brand.
1"
8 599 F.2d at 1300-01. The Lee-Moore plaintiff did not contend that the termination
violated any provisions of the dealership agreement. Rather, Lee-Moore claimed that failure
to renew amounted to an antitrust violation. See note 12 infra.
9 599 F.2d at 1301. Lee-Moore actively sought alternate brand name gasoline supplies.
Amoco Oil was willing to supply brand name gasoline for a few of Lee-Moore's stations but
because there were already numerous Amoco stations in the area, Amoco refused to supply
all of Lee-Moore's needs. Under mandatory federal fuel allocation rules, Union resumed
supplying some petroleum products to Lee-Moore in November, 1973. These products, how-
ever, were not sold at retail under the Union brand name. Id.
'0 Id. One of Lee-Moore's bases for damages was the cost incurred in converting sta-
tions from the Union brand name to a non-major brand. See text accompanying notes 65-70
infra.
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). Lee-Moore originally sought damages under § 3 of the Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976), but the district court dismissed the § 3 claim without
prejudice. Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 441 F. Supp. 730, 740-41 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies which re-
strain interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See generally VAN CISE, supra note 2, at
38-45; 16 voNKALINOWSKI, supra note 2, §§ 4.01-6.02. Under § 2 of the Sherman Act monop-
olization, an attempt to monopolize, or a combination or conspiracy to monopolize interstate
trade or commerce is a felony. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). See generally VAN CIsE, supra note 2, at
45-49; 16 vONKALINOWSKI, supra note 2, §§ 7.01-8.02.
12 599 F.2d at 1301. Lee-Moore claimed major oil producers sought to increase profit
margins and prices but were stymied by the competitive pricing techniques of certain inde-
pendent distributors. Id. The defendant's refusal to sell petroleum products to the plaintiff
would be illegal only if-the refusal was part of a conspiracy. See note 68 infra. Neither the
district court nor the Fourth Circuit considered the validity of Lee-Moore's substantive an-
titrust allegations against the defendant. See text accompanying note 23 infra.
'3 See note 2 supra. Trebling of damage awards is intended as a punitive measure. See
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
14 599 F.2d at 1301. Generally, an antitrust plaintiff may recover for increased costs
resulting from the defendant's antitrust violation, lost past net profits, and reductions in the
value of the plaintiff's business. See 16N voNKALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 115.03[1]. See
generally McSweeney, Damages, Including Proof and Causation-The "Passing On" De-
fense, in TREBLE DAMAGE ACrONS 155, 157-70 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course
Handbook No. 72, 1971) [hereinafter cited as McSweeney]; Parker, Measuring Damages in
Federal Treble Damage Actions, 17 ANrrRusT BULL. 497, 497-501 (1972); Note, Measuring
Damages in Antitrust Cases, 36 ALB. L. REv. 773, 773-77 (1972). Lee-Moore sought damages
for increased costs, see text accompanying notes 53-70 infra, and for lost profits, see text
accompanying notes 43-52 infra.
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The defendant moved for summary judgment in the action15 and the
district court granted the motion.16 The district court concluded that
even if the defendant had violated antitrust statutes, the plaintiff did not
suffer a competitive injury compensable under section 4 of the Clayton
Act.' 7 The district court noted that in the period following the
defendant's refusal to renew the contract, the plaintiff's petroleum sales
increased substantially.' The court reasoned that since an ample
alternate supply was available, the plaintiff's competitive position had not
been harmed. 9 The district court also refused to consider the possibility
that the plaintiff could recover damages for costs incurred in seeking
alternate gasoline supplies because the plaintiff would have incurred
these costs even if the defendant's termination of the distributorship
agreement had been legal.2 0 In granting summary judgment the district
court specifically did not reach the question of whether the defendant
committed substaiItive antitrust violations.2 '
The Fourth Circuit overturned the summary judgment decision and
remanded the case for a full hearing.22 Like the trial court, the appeals
court did not consider whether Union committed violations of federal
antitrust statutes.2 ' Rather, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether Lee-Moore could have suffered a competitive injury assuming
the allegations against Union were true.24 The Fourth Circuit also
"I A defendant in a civil action in federal court may move for summary judgment when
pre-trial proceedings show that no general issue of material fact exists to be tried. FED. R.
Civ. P. 56(b). See 6 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.04[1] (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
MOORE'S]. Summary judgment is discouraged in complex antitrust litigation where ques-
tions of motive and intent exist. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473
(1962). See generally 6 MooRE's, supra 56.17[5]; 16J voNKALINOWSlu, supra note 2, §
81.09[3].
"e Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 441 F. Supp. 730, 732 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
17 Id. at 739-40. See note 2 supra.
I Id. at 735, 738. See note 43 infra.
19 Id. at 738. The district court in Lee-Moore noted that an antitrust plaintiff who
claims damages based on a supplier's refusal to deal has not sustained damages if sufficient
alternate sources of supply are available. Id. The district court apparently reasoned that any
alternate source of gasoline, regardless of whether the alternate source carried a major brand
name, represented a comparable source of supply. The district court stated the plaintiff was
in the business of selling gasoline to retail outlets and that for the plaintiff to equate compa-
rable source of supply with comparable major brand was untenable. Id. at 739. On appeal,
however, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the brand name of the alternate source was
important. 599 F.2d at 1305-06. See text accompanying notes 51-52 infra.
20 441 F. Supp. at 738-39. The district court in Lee-Moore did not cite any cases sup-
porting its holding that the plaintiff could not recover certain costs because the plaintiff
would have incurred the same costs if the contract termination was legal. Id. By contrast,
the Fourth Circuit provided ample case support for concluding that the possibility of legal
termination of an agreement is immaterial in awarding damages for illegal termination. See
text accompanying notes 65-70 infra.
21 441 F. Supp. at 733-34, 740. See text accompanying note 23 infra.
22 599 F.2d at 1300, 1307.
21 Id. at 1306-07. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.




considered the types of damages the plaintiff could recover if harm was
proved at trial.2 5
The Fourth Circuit took a different approach to the issue of
competitive injury than the district court. While the district court simply
concluded that since the plaintiff had an ample alternate supply of
gasoline there was no injury to competitive position, 2 the Fourth Circuit
provided a two step analysis. The court first considered whether the
plaintiff's claimed injuries were the proximate result of the defendant's
alleged antitrust violations.27 Second, the court considered whether the
plaintiff could recover as lost profits the difference between the plaintiff's
actual market position and the plaintiff's market position but for
termination of the distributorship agreement.
2 s
In deciding that the plaintiff's injuries were the proximate result of
the defendant's alleged actions the Fourth Circuit distinguished the
Supreme Court's opinion in Brunswick Corporation v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat.29 In Brunswick, the operators of several bowling centers sought
section 4 treble damages from Brunswick, a leading manufacturer of
bowling equipment.30 Brunswick became the largest operator of bowling
centers in the nation by assuming the operations of financially troubled
centers.31 Since the Brunswick plaintiffs were competitors of the
25 See text accompanying notes 65-70 infra.
26 See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
27 599 F.2d at 1302-04.
28 Id. at 1304-05.
29 429 U.S. 477 (1977). The Lee-Moore district court in granting summary judgment did
not consider the effect of Brunswick even though Brunswick was handed down eleven
months before summary judgment was granted. Whether the district court properly could
have applied Brunswick as a basis for summary judgment is doubtful. See text accompany-
ing notes 35-42 infra.
30 429 U.S. at 479. In Brunswick, the plaintiff bowling centers claimed that Brunswick
violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). 429 U.S. at 480. Under § 7, a corpora-
tion engaged in interstate commerce is prohibited from acquiring another corporation en-
gaged in interstate commerce if the acquisition may substantially lessen competition or tend
to create a monoply. See generally VAN CISE, supra note 2, at 62-66; 16A voNKALINowsI,
supra note 2, §§ 15.01-15.05.
The plaintiffs charged that Brunswick's acquisitions of bowling centers represented a
"deep pocket" threat to the bowling center industry. See Areeda, Antitrust Violations
Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 1127, 1128 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Areeda]. See also note 31 infra. A proposed merger represents a "deep pocket" threat to an
industry when the financial resources of the incoming firm give the firm an overwhelming
and unfair advantage over competitors in the industry. See F.T.C. v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. 568, 578-79 (1967); Reynolds Metals Co. v. F.T.C., 309 F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir.
1962); Note, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.: Injury and Causation Under
Sections 4 and 7 of the Clayton Act, 10 Sw. U.L. REV. 667, 670 n.31 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Injury and Causation].
3 429 U.S. at 479-80. Brunswick's sales of automatic pinsetting equipment for bowling
centers soared in the late 1950's and Brunswick financed many of the equipment purchases.
Id. The popularity of bowling, however, waned in the early 1960's and a number of Bruns-
wick's customers defaulted on loans. In order to protect outstanding investments, Brunswick
assumed operations of a number of the defaulting centers. Although Brunswick by 1965 was
the largest single operator of bowling centers in the nation, the corporation operated only
two percent of the centers nationwide. Id.
1980]
416 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
defendant, the Supreme Court concluded that allowing damage recovery
in this instance would be anomolous, even if the defendant had violated
antitrust statutes.3 2 If Brunswick had not entered the market, the
financially troubled centers would have closed and competition would
have been reduced.3 3 The Brunswick Court reasoned that although the
plaintiffs may have suffered injuries as a result of Brunswick's entry into
the market, the plaintiff's injuries were not proximately caused by a
violation of antitrust statutes.3 '
The Fourth Circuit found Brunswick inapposite to Lee-Moore,
concluding the Brunswick opinion did not represent a radical revision of
section 4 causation law.35 The court noted that the substantive violations
32 Id. at 487.
" Id. The Brunswick Court, noted that Congress intended to protect competition, not
competitors, by enacting antitrust statutes. 429 U.S. at 488. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962) (discussing Clayton Act § 7 legislative history); note 34
infra.
"t 429 U.S. at 488. The Brunswick Court noted that the plaintiffs' competitive situation
would have been the same if the failing bowling centers had obtained refinancing or had
been purchased by small sacle competitors. Id. at 487. Yet, if the defendant in the action
had not been a comparatively large firm like Brunswick, the plaintiffs could not have
claimed there was a "deep pocket" threat to the industry and thus would have no cause of
action for statutory antitrust violation, an essential element of § 4 recovery. See Areeda,
supra note 30, at 1133. See also notes 2 & 30 supra.
The Supreme Court's differentiation of compensable and non-compensable injuries
stemming from an antitrust violation may be analogized to foreseeability of injury and re-
coverable and non-recoverable damages in tort law. See Carstensen, Annual Survey of Anti-
trust Developments 1976-77, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 81-84 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Carstensen]. If the Supreme Court in Brunswick had held that a plaintiff may recover for all
injuries stemming from a defendant's violation of an antitrust statute, the Court's holding
would be analogous to In re Poleimis and Furness Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.). In
Poleimis the defendant was held liable for all injuries stemming from a tortious act even
though some of the injuries were not forseeable. See Carstensen, supra at 81. The Bruns-
wick Court's approach, however, is analogous to Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts
Dock & Eng'r Co., Ltd., [1961] A.C. 388 (the Wagon Mound case) where the Poleimis ap-
proach was rejected and the defendant was held liable only for those injuries which were
foreseeable results of the tortious act. Similarly, Brunswick would be liable to competitors
only for those injuries caused by Brunswick's representing a "deep pocket" threat to the
bowling center industry. See Carstensen, supra at 83. See also Pollock, The "Injury" and
"Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 691, 699-
700 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Pollock].
31 599 F.2d at 1303. While the Lee-Moore court read Brunswick as not substantially
affecting private antitrust litigation, Brunswick may have a substantial effect on the causa-
tion question in private § 7 monopolization litigation. See 16N voNKALINOWSKI, supra note
2, § 115.02[3][b][i]; Injury and Causation, supra note 30, at 684-92. Prior to Brunswick,
courts generally decided the causation issue by inquiring whether the plaintiff had standing
to sue. See Note, Treble Damage Actions for Violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 38
U. CHi. L. REv. 404, 407-08 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Violations of Section 7]. In ascer-
taining standing to sue, courts utilized two different approaches. Some courts inquired
whether the plaintiff was in the target area of the alleged antitrust violation. See, e.g., Dai-
ley v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1967). Other courts took a
more restrictive approach and inquired whether the injury actually occurred after the alleg-
edly illegal merger took place. See, e.g., Ames v. Bostich, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521, 524-25
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in Brunswick arose under section 7 of the Clayton Act3 6 while Lee-Moore
was based on sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act."7 While
monopolization as alleged in Brunswick is not necessarily a violation of
the law,33 conspiratorial refusal to deal with a trader, as alleged in Lee-
Moore, is considered a per se violation of antitrust statutes.39 The Fourth
Circuit noted that victims of a section 1 conspiracy typically are harmed
by the defendant's statutory violation, thus providing victims with
standing to recover damages. 40  While principally distinguishing
Brunswick on the basis of the underlying antitrust violations, the Lee-
Moore court also noted that the factual setting of Lee-Moore
distinguished it from Brunswick. Unlike Brunswick, causation could be
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). See generally 16N voNKALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 115.02[4]; Pollock,
supra note 34, at 701-06; Violations of Section 7, supra at 410-17. The Brunswick causation
approach of inquiring whether the plaintiff's injuries were actually caused by the statutory
antitrust violation had been adopted previously in other antitrust contexts, see note 40 in-
fra, and had been advocated by commentators. See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 30, at 1134-36;
Klingsberg, Bull's Eyes and Carom Shots: Complications and Conflicts on Standing to Sue
and Causation Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 16 ANTIRusT BuLL. 351, 369 (1971).
" See note 30 supra.
' 599 F.2d at 1301. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra. See also text accompa-
nying notes 38-39 infra.
"8 See Areeda, supra note 30, at 1128-36. Some courts have held that private plaintiffs
can never bring § 4 actions for § 7 violations because § 7 addresses potential rather than
actual restraints of trade and an antitrust plaintiff can only bring action for actual injuries.
See, e.g., Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 414
F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969). Brunswick, however, acknowledged that § 4 remedies are available
for actions based on § 7. 429 U.S. at 489. See 16N voNKALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 115.03[4].
3, 599 F.2d at 1303. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 210-14
(1959). See also text accompanying notes 68-70 infra. In Klor's, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant was part of a conspiracy denying the plaintiff the right to sell certain brands of
appliances. 359 U.S. at 212. The Supreme Court in Klor's held group boycotts and concerted
refusals to deal with customers are per se antitrust violations. Id. at 213. See generally
Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on the Klor's
Case, 45 VA. L. REv. 1165 (1959) (criticizing Klor's). Per se antitrust violations are those
agreements or practices which, because of their pernicious effect on competition, are conclu-
sively presumed to be illegal without elaborate inquiry into the precise harm caused by the
practice. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See generally 16
VONKALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 6.02[3].
40 599 F.2d at 1303-04. See Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An
Uprecedented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 979, 993-94 (1977) (Bruns-
wick will have little effect on causation in many § 1 actions). Despite the Fourth Circuit's
contrary interpretation of Brunswick, there may be instances where a victim of a § 1 con-
spiratorial refusal to deal may lack standing to sue. In GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., Inc.,
463 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 413 U.S. 901 (1973), the plaintiff sought § 4
damages alleging that the defendant had conspired, in violation of Sherman Act §§ 1 and 2,
to restrain interstate commerce by illegally seeking to merge with the plaintiff. As part of
this conspiracy the defendant stopped dealing with the plaintiff and the plaintiff claimed
lost profits. See note 48 infra. The Second Circuit held the plaintiff had no standing to sue,
concluding that if there had been an illegal monopolization of interstate commerce, the
plaintiff's competitors, not the plaintiff, would have suffered antitrust injuries. 463 F.2d at
557-58.
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found between the Lee-Moore defendant's alleged statutory violations
and the plaintiff's injuries."' In Lee-Moore, the plaintiff sought to remain
in business thus enhancing competition, while the Brunswick plaintiffs
effectively sought to limit competition.4
2
The Fourth Circuit in Lee-Moore next considered whether the
plaintiff could have suffered any injuries for lost profits since the
plaintiff's sales and profits increased after the alleged antitrust
violation.4'3 The court reasoned that whether Lee-Moore's profits rose
following the violation was immaterial. 4" The assessment of damages for
lost profits is relative in nature 5 and Lee-Moore could have suffered a
compensable injury if profits would have been higher but for Union's
alleged antitrust violation.46 The court noted that if lost profits damages
were not assessed on a relative basis many antitrust violators could
escape section 4 liability.47 If profits for all companies in the violator's
industry were increasing, the injured competitors' profits would also be
increasing, although at a rate depressed by the violator's activities.48
41 599 F.2d at 1304.
42 Id. See text accompanying note 33 supra. In Lee-Moore the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant terminated the dealership agreement in furtherance of a conspiracy among major
oil companies to stop competitive independent distributors from handling major brand gas-
oline. See text accompanying note 12 supra. All of Lee-Moore's claimed injuries stem from
the inability to sell major brand gasoline. See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
43 599 F.2d at 1304. In 1973, the year following Union's termination of the dealership
agreement, Lee-Moore received approximiately 17% more gasoline from suppliers than in
1972. By 1975 Lee-Moore's petroleum sales were more than double the 1972 level and prof-
its were 2.6 times higher than in 1972, the last year Union supplied brand name gasoline to
Lee-Moore. See 599 F.2d at 1307-08 (Widener, J., dissenting). Numerous courts have recog-
nized that lost profits are the principal area of recovery in conspiratorial refusal to deal
cases. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1969)
(conspiracy concerning international patents); Becken v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d 1, 4-5 (7th
Cir. 1959) (conspiracy to set prices). See also 16A voNKALINOWSKI, supra note 2, §
11.04[1][d].
" 599 F.2d at 1304-05.
" See Pollock, supra note 34, at 694-95. An inquiry into lost profits should not consider
the size of the plaintiff's business or growth in the plaintiff's profit rate. Rather, the court
should consider whether the plaintiff would be in a relatively better position if the defen-
dant's misdeeds had not taken place. Id. See note 48 infra.
46 599 F.2d at 1304-05.
41 Id. at 1305. Cf. Areeda, supra note 30, at 1128-30 (certain violators of Clayton Act §
7 may be immune from § 4 liability because no competitor of the violator has been injured).
48 599 F.2d at 1305. The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that lost profits from antitrust
injuries should be assessed on a relative basis appears to conflict with the Second Circuit,
but is in accord with the Fifth Circuit. See Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mo-
hammad, 586 F.2d 530, 547 (5th Cir. 1978); GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752, 759
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 413 U.S. 901 (1973). In GAF the plaintiff alleged that Circle
Floor illegally attempted to gain control of GAF by, inter alia, discontinuing purchases of
floor tile from GAF. GAF sought damages for lost profits resulting from the discontinued
purchases. See note 40 supra. The Second Circuit denied recovery, noting that GAF alleged
only that it could not sell the normal amount of floor tile to Circle Floor. The GAF court
could not perceive how GAF suffered lost profits since overall sales had not decreased and
only the indentity of the purchasers had changed. 463 F.2d at 759. The Fourth Circuit dis-
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While recognizing that the Lee-Moore plaintiff could recover lost profits,
the Fourth Circuit left the issue of whether Union's actions actually
depressed Lee-Moore's profits for trial.49 The Fourth Circuit also
concluded that the availability of an alternate gasoline supply did not
preclude the possibility of antitrust injury.50 While antitrust defendants
can escape liability for section 4 damages if the plaintiff locates a
comparable alternate product,51 the Fourth Circuit decided that gasoline
which could not be sold under a major brand name was not necessarily
comparable to major brand gasoline.
52
tinguished GAP from Lee-Moore on the facts. The Fourth Circuit hypothesized that GAF
would have been decided differently if GAF had alleged that profits would have risen rather
than remaining stable but for Circle Floor's illegal acts. 599 F.2d at 1305 n.10. The Fourth
Circuit clearly misread GAP. The GAF opinion states that GAF was denied recovery be-
cause GAF did not allege suffering a decrease in total sales. 463 F.2d at 759.
The Fifth Circuit in Mohammad took a similar position to Lee-Moore on lost profits. In
Mohammad, the plaintiff, a medical clinic, alleged that a group of doctors had conspired to
fix prices and control the performance of abortions in Tallahassee, Florida. The Fifth Cir-
cuit overturned an award of summary judgment for the defendants. 586 F.2d at 547. The
defendants argued that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue because the plaintiff's profits
rose during the period of the alleged antitrust violations. The court noted there was no
assurance that the alleged actions of the defendants did not retard the plaintiff's growth. Id.
As did the Fourth Circuit in Lee-Moore, the Fifth Circuit concluded that an increase in an
antitrust plaintiff's income does not preclude existence of injury any more than a decrease
in income proves there has been an injury. Id.
49 See text accompanying notes 74-76 infra.
:0 599 F.2d at 1305.
'1 See Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 459 F.2d 138, 148-
49 (6th Cir. 1972) (damage award overturned as plaintiff had not demonstrated that compa-
rable alternate brands were unavailable); Ace Beer Distrib., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283,
287 (6th Cir. 1963) (dismissal of action upheld as plaintiff failed to demonstrate inability to
distribute alternate brand of beer). See also note 52 infra.
52 599 F.2d at 1305-06. In Lee-Moore, both the majority and dissenting opinions consid-
ered Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 459 F.2d 138 (6th Cir.
1972), and Mullis v. ARCO Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1974), in deciding
whether independent brand gasoline is a comparable alternate product to major brand gaso-
line. See 599 F.2d at 1305-06, 1308.
In Elder-Beerman, the plaintiff filed for § 4 damages claiming that the defendant was
part of a conspriacy restricting the brands of appliances the plaintiff could sell. 459 F.2d at
139-40. Judge Widener, dissenting in Lee-Moore, cited Elder-Beerman for the proposition
that a plaintiff whose supply contract is terminated suffers no injury if an adequate supply
of a comparable alternate product is available. 599 F.2d at 1308 (Widener, J., dissenting).
Actually, the Elder-Beerman plaintiff was denied recovery because the evidence was insuffi-
cient to establish that comparable brands were unavailable, thereby decreasing sales. 459
F.2d at 148-49.
In Mullis, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief to prevent the defendant from terminat-
ing a dealership agreement and claimed the defendant had violated § 2 of the Sherman Act.
502 F.2d at 292-93. For the plaintiff to prove a § 2 violation, a court must find that the
defendant attempted to monopolize a "relevant market." The court must consider what con-
stitutes a particular relevant market. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 575-
76 (1966)(relevant geographic market considered); United States v. duPont & Co., 351 U.S.
377, 394-96 (1956) (relevant product market considered); 16 voNKALINOWSKI, supra note 2, §
8.02[2]. To find that ARCO gasoline was a relevant market, the Mullis court required proof
that ARCO brand gasoline was a unique product. The court admitted ARCO brand gasoline
19801 .419
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The Lee-Moore court next considered whether the plaintiff could
recover the difference between the cost paid for alternate gasoline
supplies and the amount the plaintiff would have paid if Union had not
terminated the agreement.5 Union argued that the additional costs were
not recoverable because the plaintiff had passed the costs on to
customers.54 The Fourth Circuit disagreed, relying on Hanover Shoe, Inc.
v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.°5 which generally disallowed the pass-on
defense." In Hanover Shoe, the plaintiff sought damages for the extra
costs incurred in leasing machinery from the defendant, claiming that the
leasing costs were artifically high because of antitrust violations.57 The
Supreme Court rejected United Shoe's defense that Hanover Shoe had
passed the higher cost on to customers.5 8 The Hanover Shoe Court
expressed an unwillingness to relieve antitrust violators from financial
liability simply because of the difficulty in assessing antitrust injury and
damages.59
The Hanover Shoe Court, however, recognized that in certain
circumstances the pass-on defense may be appropriate.60 While the Lee-
was possibly a unique product but the court found no evidence of uniqueness in the record
of the case. 502 F.2d at 296. By contrast, in Lee-Moore the plaintiff made several claims
concerning the uniqueness of Union and other major brand petroleum products. 599 F.2d at
1301. The Lee-Moore plaintiff noted that the advantages of major brand customer goodwill,
advertising, and credit cards were lost by switching to a non-major independent brand. Id.
See also Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc., v. Texaco, 478 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(Texaco gasoline does not constitute relevant market for § 2 monopolization). But see Jen-
nings Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., [1979] 931 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-17, A-
17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1979)(summary judgment denied because Mobil gasoline may alone
constitute a relevant market for § 2 monopolization.)
53 599 F.2d at 1305-06. Lee-Moore alleged that the gasoline purchased to replace Union
gasoline cost one to twenty cents more per gallon than Union gasoline. Id.
54 Id.
55 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
56 599 F.2d at 1306. See text accompanying note 60 infra. Under a "pass-on" defense,
the defendant claims that the plaintiff is not entitled to damages, even if the defendant is
guilty of the alleged antitrust violation, because the plaintiff has passed the illegal extra
costs on to customers. Id. See generally MdSweeney, supra note 14, at 170-83; 16N
VONKALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 115.0316]; Shapiro, Proof of Damages-A Causation Per-
spective, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 88, 89-90 (1975).
57 392 U.S. at 483-84.
68 Id. at 489. The Court in Hanover Shoe reasoned that as long as the price the buyer
pays is illegally high, the seller is taking more than allowed by law. Thus, the buyer's profits
are unnecessarily depressed. Id.
59 Id. at 492-93. In Hanover Shoe, the illegally high cost for leasing machinery was only
one factor in the plaintiff's pricing scheme for shoes. The Court noted that the plaintiff
would have difficulty providing the exact effect of a single factor on an overall pricing
scheme. Id.
60 392 U.S. at 494. The Hanover Shoe Court gave "cost plus" contracts as an example
of where the pass-on defense would be appropriate. Id. Under a "cost plus" contract, the
purchaser pays all of the costs incurred by the seller in performance of the contract plus a
fixed fee over and above such costs. See Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. Bloom,
139 Conn. 700, -, 96 A.2d 758, 759 (1953). The overcharges in a "cost plus" contract thus
are easily traceable to the eventual customer. See text accompanying note 61 infra.
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Moore court applied Hanover Shoe to reject Union's use of the pass-on
defense,61 reasons for prohibiting the defense in Hanover Shoe are largely
inapplicable to the facts of Lee-Moore. Unlike the pass-on effect in
Hanover Shoe, the pass-on effect in Lee-Moore would be easily
calculable.6 2 Further, while the pass-on defense in Hanover Shoe would
have allowed the defendant to escape all financial liability, the Lee-Moore
defendant would still be liable for lost profits and other costs.6 3 Finally,
the magnitude of the potential damages in Lee-Moore compared to the
harm suffered by the plaintiff would lead to recovery of windfall
damages.6 4 Thus Lee-Moore may be a situation where use of the defense
would be appropriate.
The Lee-Moore court also approved expenses the plaintiff incurred in
seeking alternate supplies and converting stations to a non-major,
independent brand as a basis for recovery of damages. 5 The Fourth
Circuit, disagreeing with the district court,66 concluded that although
Lee-Moore would have incurred search and changeover costs had the
agreement been legally terminated, recovery was not precluded if the
contract termination was illegal.6 7 The court noted that a supplier may
refuse to deal with a customer only when the refusal is not part of an
illegal combination or agreement.6 ' Since Lee-Moore alleged that Union's
61 599 F.2d at 1306. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
62 While the cost of shoe machinery in Hanover Shoe was only one of many factors in
the plaintiff's pricing scheme, see note 59 supra, the price Lee-Moore paid for petroleum
products would have been the principal element in determining the price Lee-Moore
charged retailers. See note 60 supra. The position of Lee-Moore is similar to that of the
plaintiffs in the "oil jobber" cases. See, e.g., Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944). In the "oil jobber" cases
courts allowed the defendant oil companies to use the pass-on defense even though the
plaintiffs proved a conspiracy among the defendants to illegally raise gasoline prices. 138
F.2d at 971. See McSweeney, supra note 14, at 180 ("oil jobber" cases represented high
point of pass-on defense).
63 See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra and 65-70 infra.
599 F.2d at 1308 (Widener, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 1306-07. See note 70 infra.
66 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
67 599 F.2d at 1302.
Id. In considering the illegality of conspiratorial refusals to deal, the Lee-Moore court
cited Unted States v. Colgate Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) and United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). In Colgate, the defendant forced retailers to maintain certain mini-
mum prices by refusing to deal with retailers that sold products below the minimum prices.
250 U.S. at 302-03. The Supreme Court refused to find a Sherman Act violation since if a
monopoly is not created, a manufacturer or trader engaged in private enterprise may exer-
cise independent discretion in choosing with whom he will deal. Id. at 307.
In Parke, Davis, the defendant was also charged with enforcing minimum retail prices
by refusing to deal with parties that did not observe minimum pricing schemes. 362 U.S. at
30-32. Unlike the Colgate defendant, the defendant in Parke, Davis was found guilty of
antitrust violations. The Court found that the defendant had created an illegal conspiracy to
enforce the prices by blackmailing wholesalers. Id. at 45. See generally Osborn v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 324 F.2d 566, 573 (4th Cir. 1963)(Colgate and Parke, Davis discussed); 16
voNKALNOWSKI, supra note 2, § 6.02[2][c] at 6-87 n.34; Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate
Doctrine: The Ban on Resale Price Maintenance, [1960] S. CT. REv. 258.
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refusal to deal was part of an illegal conspiracy,s costs incurred as a
result of the contract termination could be the result of an antitrust
violation.70
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Lee-Moore that an antitrust
plaintiff can suffer a compensable injury even though the plaintiff's
profits increased following the defendant's anticompetitive act is well
reasoned.7 '1 However, the court's decision to remand the case in full may
be faulted as imprudent. Dissenting Judge Widener concluded that under
the facts of Lee-Moore s the plaintiff would have difficulty at trial
proving actual injury. 3 Widener would have initially remanded only for a
consideration of whether Union's termination of the dealership agreement
actually injured Lee-Moore's business and lowered Lee-Moore's profits.74
Only upon proof of injury would the district court have considered
whether Union violated substantive antitrust statutes.7 5 Widener's partial
remand would have been a reasonable disposition of the case. If Lee-
Moore was unable to prove actual injury on remand, extenuated and
intricate litigation on the alleged underlying statutory violations would
have been avoided.7 6 A limited remand thus could have prevented waste
of private and judicial resources while allowing the plaintiff ample
opportunity to establish section 4 injury. By giving the plaintiff an
opportunity to fully establish the existence of injury, the court would
have recognized the importance of private antitrust litigation in
09 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
70 See note 42 supra. The Lee-Moore court cited several cases where courts allowed
recovery of damage for illegal refusals to deal where no damage recovery would be possible if
the refusal to deal was legal. 599 F.2d at 1302 n.5. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 210-14 (1959) (conspiracy among competitors of plaintiff and manufac-
turers to deny plaintiff right to sell certain items); Taxi Weekly, Inc. v. Metropolitan Taxi-
cab Bd. of Trade, Inc., 539 F.2d 907, 913-15 (2d Cir. 1976) (conspiracy to drive plaintiff
newspaper out of business by refusal to deal); Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 324 F.2d 566,
575 (4th Cir. 1963) (refusal to deal with plaintiff unless plaintiff followed illegal tying agree-
ment); Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709, 713-16 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. de-
nied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960) (illegal refusal to purchase plaintiff's products).
71 See text accompanying notes 43-49 supra.
712 See note 43 supra.
73 599 F.2d at 1306 (Widener, J., dissenting). In proving actual injury at trial, the Lee-
Moore plaintiff would have to demonstrate the existence of lost profits while profits in-
creased substantially. Id. See text accompanying notes 43-49 supra.
74 Id. at 1307. Judge Widener, dissenting in Lee-Moore, asserted the record failed to
show conclusively that the defendant's actions did not depress the plaintiff's profits. Id.
75 Id.
7'6 The potential for protracted litigation in Lee-Moore is obvious. The plaintiff first
filed suit in October, 1973 and over four years later the action had reached only summary
judgment. 441 F. Supp. at 733. The Fourth Circuit did not overturn the grant of summary
judgment until eighteen months later. 599 F.2d at 1299. Thus, five and a half years after the
action was instituted the case had not yet gone to trial. Further, no court during that five
and half year period had considered the merits of the defendant's alleged antitrust violation,
an intricate issue left completely for trial.
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